Introduced

MORATORIUM ON EVICTION PROCEEDINGS (SECTION 67.137)

This act provides that no county, municipality, or political subdivision shall impose or otherwise enforce a moratorium on eviction proceedings unless specifically authorized by law.

This provision is identical to a provision in CCS/HCS/SS/SB 222 (2023), is substantially similar to a provision in HB 730 (2023), in HCS/HB 1682 (2022), in HCS/HB 2218 (2022), and in SCS/HB 2593 (2022), and is similar to a provision in SB 239 (2023), in SB 1044 (2022), in SS/HCS/HB 1662 (2022), and in HB 2360 (2022).

COURT DISSOLUTION OF A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (SECTION 347.143)

The act modifies the procedure by which a court may decree dissolution of an LLC. Specifically, in addition to circumstances where it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the operating agreement, the court may issue such a decree if it determines: (1) Dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining members;

(2) The business of the limited liability company has been abandoned;

(3) The management of the limited liability company is deadlocked or subject to internal dissension; or

(4) Those in control of the limited liability company have been found guilty of, or have knowingly countenanced, persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement, or abuse of authority.

This provision is identical to a provision in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 85 (2023), HB 278 (2023), SB 401 (2023), and SB 475 (2023).

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES (SECTIONS 435.014 AND 435.300 TO 435.312)

This act establishes provisions relating to procedures for alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") processes. A court may refer, either by rule or order, any individual civil case or category of civil cases to any nonbinding ADR process. Within 30 days of referral, the parties may:

(1) Notify the court that the parties have chosen pursuant to a written agreement to pursue an ADR process different from the ADR process chosen by the court;

(2) Notify the court that the parties have agreed to delay such ADR process until a date certain; or

(3) If any party, after conferring with the other parties, concludes that the ADR process has no reasonable chance of helping the parties understand or resolve a procedural or substantive issue or if there is a compelling circumstance, the party may file a motion to not participate in the ADR process.

Once a motion has been filed, the ADR process shall not occur until a ruling and, if granted, the matter shall not be referred without compelling circumstances. In any action referred to an ADR process, discovery may proceed in any other action before, during, and after the ADR process, except the court may stay discovery to promote savings in time and expense.

A neutral individual ("neutral") appointed by the court or requested by the parties to serve in the ADR process shall avoid any conflict of interest. Even if the neutral believes that no disqualifying conflict exists, the neutral shall:

(1) Before agreeing to serve, make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether there are facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the neutral has a conflict of interest;

(2) As soon as practicable, disclose reasonably known facts relevant to any conflicts of interest; and

(3) After accepting a designation, disclose any previously undisclosed information that could reasonably suggest a conflict of interest.

After disclosure of a conflict, the ADR process may proceed if all parties have agreed in writing or if the organization administering the ADR process determines under the parties' written agreement that the neutral may continue to serve. Any party believing a court-appointed neutral has a conflict of interest may request for the neutral to recuse himself or may file a motion for disqualification. Additionally, the court may require a change of a neutral if necessary to protect the rights of an unrepresented party.

ADR communications, as defined in the act, shall not be admissible as evidence in any proceeding or subject to discovery. However, evidence that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery shall not be inadmissible or protected from discovery solely because of its disclosure or use in the ADR process. Additionally, a court may admit communications, upon motion by a party and following a hearing, if the court finds that the communication is relevant and admissible and was:

(1) Made in the presence of a mandated reporter and pertains to abuse or neglect that such mandated reporter is required to report;

(2) A substantial threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury capable of causing death or substantial bodily harm that is reasonably certain to occur;

(3) Intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit a crime, or to conceal an ongoing crime; or

(4) Necessary to establish or defend against a professional misconduct or malpractice claim that is based on conduct occurring during the ADR process.

If requested by a party or if necessary to ensure confidentiality, the hearing shall be conducted in the judge's chambers. A participant, including the neutral, has standing to intervene in any proceedings in order to object to the admissibility of communications made by such participant.

Additionally, this act provides that no neutral, or agent or employee of the neutral or of the neutral's organization, shall be subpoenaed or compelled to disclose any ADR communication. No neutral who is a licensed attorney shall be required to disclose any ADR communication of which a reporting obligation in the rules of professional conduct of attorneys might otherwise apply. However, a neutral may be subpoenaed to enforce a written settlement agreement, but only to testify that the parties signed such agreement in his or her presence. The court may order the party seeking admission of an ADR communication to pay the costs and fees of the neutral or any other participant who intervenes to contest the admission or who responds to a subpoena regarding the ADR communications.

Unless a written agreement provides for a binding ADR process, the processes conducted pursuant to this act shall be nonbinding. Furthermore, this act shall not preclude any court from referring any matter to a nonbinding ADR process.

This act shall only apply to ADR processes referred by court order or rule or by a written agreement of the parties expressly providing for this act to apply. This act is not intended to undermine the right to a jury trial nor does this act require any party to settle any claim or attend a mediation with counsel.

If the court has not referred the parties to an ADR process or if the parties elect not to use the provisions of this act, the process shall be regarded as settlement negotiations. If the parties have agreed in writing to an ADR process but have not invoked the provisions of this act, the neutral shall not be subpoenaed or otherwise compelled to disclose any matter revealed in the setting up or conducting of such ADR process. Finally, this act requires all settlement agreements to be in writing.

These provisions are substantially similar to CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 82 (2023), SB 215 (2023), provisions in SCS/HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), SB 1148 (2022), SB 591 (2021), HB 953 (2021), and HB 2534 (2020), and are similar to HB 2660 (2022).

CLASSIFICATION OF MINORS FOR ORDERS OF PROTECTION (SECTIONS 455.010, 455.035 AND 455.513)

This act modifies the definitions of "adult" and "child" in provisions relating to orders of protection. An "adult" is any person eighteen, instead of seventeen, years of age or older and a "child" is any person under eighteen, instead of seventeen, years of age unless he or she is otherwise emancipated.

These provisions are identical to provisions in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HCS/HB 355 (2023), in HB 981 (2023), in SCS/HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), and in HCS/HB 1559 (2022).

PRINCIPAL PLACE OF ADMINISTRATION OF A TRUST (SECTION 456.1-108)

This act provides that the notice of proposed transfer of a trust's principal place of administration shall include a notice stating that a change in the place of administration may result in a change of the trust's governing law, which may affect the rights of any beneficiaries in ways the new governing law differs from the current governing law.

This provision is identical to a provision in SB 1221 (2024) and SB 569 (2023).

UNIFORM ELECTRONIC WILLS AND ELECTRONIC ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS ACT (SECTIONS 474.540 TO 474.564)

This act establishes the "Uniform Electronic Wills and Electronic Estate Planning Documents Act," which provides for the execution of wills through electronic methods.

An electronic will shall be a will for all purposes of the laws of this state. An electronic will is a record that is readable, and remains accessible, as text at the time of signing by the testator or by another individual in the testator's name, in the testator's physical presence, and by the testator's direction. Additionally, an electronic will shall be signed by at least two individuals in the physical or electronic presence of the testator within a reasonable amount of time after witnessing the signing of the will or acknowledgment of the will or signing. Additionally, this act provides that an electronic will not executed in compliance with these requirements shall still be an electronic will under this act if executed in compliance with the law of the jurisdiction where the testator is physically located, domiciled, or resides when the will was signed or where the testator is domiciled or resides upon his or her death.

The intent of the testator that the record be an electronic will may be established by extrinsic evidence. As provided in the act, an electronic will may be made self-proving by acknowledgment of the testator.

An electronic will may revoke all or part of a previous will and an electronic will shall be revoked by use of:

(1) A subsequent will that revokes the electronic will expressly or by inconsistency;

(2) A written instrument signed by the testator declaring the revocation; or

(3) A physical act, if established by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator, with the intent of revoking, performed or directed another individual to perform the act in the testator's physical presence.

Additionally, if there is evidence that a testator signed an electronic will, but neither the electronic will nor a certified paper copy can be located after a testator's death, there shall be a presumption that the testator revoked the electronic will, even if no instrument or later will revoking such electronic will can be located. At any time during the administration of the estate or as determined by the court if there is no grant of administration, the court may issue an order for a custodian of an account held under a terms-of-service agreement to disclose digital assets for purposes of obtaining an electronic will from the account of a deceased user.

Furthermore, this act provides that any written estate planning document, as defined in the act, may be executed electronically and no such estate planning document shall be invalid or void solely because of its electronic form or electronic signatures. Any written estate planning document that requires one or more witnesses to the signature of a principal may be witnessed by any individual in the electronic presence of the principal. Additionally, this act provides that a person who acts in reliance upon an electronically executed written estate planning document shall not be liable to any person for so relying and may assume without inquiry the valid execution of the electronically executed written estate planning document.

An individual may create a certified paper copy of an electronic will or estate planning document by affirming under penalty of perjury that a paper copy of the electronic will or document is a complete, true, and accurate copy. If a provision of law or rule of procedure requires a will or document to be presented or retained in its original form or provides consequences for the failure to present or retain the will or document in its original form, a certified paper copy shall satisfy the provision or rule.

This act also supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, except for certain provisions relating to consumer disclosures, and does not authorize electronic delivery of certain notices.

Finally, this act shall apply to any will of a decedent who dies on or after August 28, 2024, and to any written estate planning document signed or remotely witnessed on or after August 28, 2024.

These provisions are identical to provisions in SB 1221 (2024) and in SB 569 (2023) and are substantially similar to provisions in HCS/HB 1886 (2024), CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023) and in HB 881 (2023).

ESTATE PLANNING DURING COVID-19 (SECTION 474.600)

With respect to the execution of an estate planning document, a person required for the execution of an estate planning document shall be deemed to have satisfied any physical presence requirement under Missouri law during the COVID-19 state of emergency if the following requirements were met:

(1) The signer affirmatively represented that he or she was physically in this state;

(2) The notary was physically located in this state and stated the county he or she was physically located in;

(3) The notary identified the signers to the satisfaction of the notary and Missouri law;

(4) Any person whose signature was required appeared using video conference software where live, interactive audio-visual communication between the principal, notary, and any other necessary person allowed for observation, direct interaction, and communication at the time of signing; and

(5) The notary recorded in his or her journal the exact time and means used to perform the act.

These requirements shall be deemed satisfied if a licensed Missouri attorney present at the remote execution signs a written acknowledgment made before an officer authorized to administer oaths and evidenced by the officer's certificate, which shall be affixed to or logically associated with the acknowledgment.

This provision is substantially similar to a provision in SB 1221 (2024), CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in SB 569 (2023), and in HB 881 (2023).

GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP: APPOINTMENT OF GRANDPARENTS AND PERSONS ACTING AS PARENTS (SECTIONS 475.010, 475.045, 475.050, 475.063 AND 488.2300)

This act provides that the court shall consider persons acting as a parent for a minor entering adult guardianship, as defined in the act, to be appointed as guardians or conservators. This act also provides that the court shall adopt forms for petitions for emergency, temporary, and full orders regarding a minor entering adult guardianship or conservatorship and court clerks shall assist petitioners who are not represented by counsel with the procedures for filing such petitions. Notice of such assistance shall be posted in the clerk's office and the location where such petition is filed shall be posted in the court building. Additionally, no filing fees, court costs, bonds, or clerk assistance shall be assessed to petitioners. However, the fees for certain court-appointed individuals in guardianship and conservatorship hearings and expenses incurred as a result of petitions filed in accordance with this act shall be reimbursed from the Family Services and Justice Fund, which moneys may be appropriated into by the General Assembly.

Currently, individuals, except for public administrators and certain family members, seeking appointment as a guardian or conservator are required to submit the results of a background screening to the court. This act includes any persons acting as a parent and any grandparent that is seeking a guardianship or conservatorship of a minor grandchild in the category of exempted individuals unless such background report is requested by any other party, the guardian ad litem, or the court. Additionally, any grandparent that is seeking a guardianship or conservatorship of a minor grandchild shall not be subject to a home assessment unless requested by certain parties.

These provisions are identical to provisions CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023) and are similar to provisions in HCS/HB 881 (2023), in HB 911 (2023), in SCS/HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), in HB 1204 (2023), in HCS/SS/SCS/SB 683 (2022), HB 2056 (2022), in HCS#2/SCS/SB 91 (2021), HB 1003 (2021), and HCS/HB 1558 (2020).

DISCLOSURE OF THIRD PARTY LEGAL FUNDING (SECTION 476.413)

This act provides that all parties, including intervening parties, shall disclose and file within a statement, separate from any pleading, containing certain information as described in the act regarding any consumer legal funding contract or any other agreement with any person or entity that is not a party and is providing funding for some or all of the attorneys' fees and expenses for the action or litigation on a nonrecourse basis in exchange for a contingent financial interest based upon the results of the action or litigation or a nonmonetary result that is not in the nature of a personal loan, bank loan, or insurance. The parties shall file the statement by September 30, 2024, for any pending action filed before August 28, 2024, or within 30 days for any action or pleading filed on or after August 28, 2024.

The parties may seek additional discovery of the terms of any such consumer legal funding contract or any other agreement subject to disclosure pursuant to this act if there is a showing of good cause that:

(1) The nonparty has authority to make material decisions regarding the action;

(2) The interest of the parties, or if applicable, the class, are not being promoted or protected;

(3) Conflicts of interest may exist; or

(4) Such additional disclosure is necessary to any issue in the action.

If a party learns of information that is required to be disclosed after the initial pleading or if a party learns of incomplete or inaccurate information in any material aspect of the statement, the party shall supplement or correct the statement within seven days. If a party is joined after the date of the initial pleading, such party shall provide the statement within thirty days of the later of being served or joined, unless a different time is set by stipulation or court order.

If a party fails to disclose or meet the requirements of this act, the court may order sanctions or other relief as may be appropriate.

Beginning on September 1, 2025, and on every September first thereafter, the Supreme Court of Missouri shall release a report regarding statistics for litigation funding in courts of this state.

REFERENCES TO THE CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT (SECTION 487.110)

This act modifies references to the title and sections of law of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which was repealed in 2009, to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act for the provision relating to child custody proceedings in family courts.

This provision is identical to a provision in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in HCS/SS/SB 198 (2023), in HCS/SS/SB 213 (2023), HB 500 (2023), SB 528 (2023), in SCS/HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), in HCS/HB 1058 (2023), in HB 1151 (2023), and in HB 1271 (2023).

COMPENSATION OF JURORS (SECTIONS 488.040 AND 494.455)

Currently, a juror shall receive seven cents per mile to and from his or her place of residence and the courthouse. This act modifies the mileage rate of jurors to the mileage rate of state employees, which is currently provided at sixty-five and half cents. Current law also provides that grand or petit jurors in certain counties, including in Clay and Greene, shall not receive compensation for the first two days of service, but shall receive fifty dollars with seven cents per mile for the third and any subsequent days that the juror actually serves. This act provides that the circuit court may adopt for each county or for the City of St. Louis a system of juror compensation that provides grand or petit jurors to receive no compensation on the first two days of actual service, but receive fifty dollars with the state employee mileage rate for the third and any subsequent days of actual service.

This act is identical to provisions in SB 1220 (2024), is substantially similar to HB 1457 (2024), and is similar to provisions in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024) and in HCS/HB 2064 (2024).

ST. LOUIS CITY CIRCUIT COURT CIVIL CASE FILING SURCHARGE (SECTION 488.426)

Currently, any circuit court may collect a civil case filing surcharge of an amount not to exceed $15 for the maintenance of a law library, the county's or circuit's family services and justice fund, or courtroom renovation and technology enhancement. If the circuit court reimburses the state for salaries of family court commissioners or is the circuit court in Jackson County, the fee may be up to $20. This act provides that the circuit court in the City of St. Louis may charge a filing surcharge up to $20.

This provision is identical to a provision in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 787 (2023), in HCS/HB 986 (2023), and in the perfected HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), and is substantially similar to SB 252 (2023), SB 1209 (2022), HB 1963 (2022), HB 143 (2021), HB 1554 (2020), HB 1224 (2019), a provision in the perfected HCS/HB 1083 (2019), HB 1891 (2018), SB 288 (2017), HB 391 (2017), and SB 812 (2016).

ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS OF CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE PERSONS IN CRIMINAL CASES (SECTIONS 491.075 AND 492.304)

Under current law, a statement made by a child under 14 years of age may be admissible in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances. This act changes the age to a child under the age of 18 years of age.

Additionally, this act provides that visual or audio recordings of a child under 18 years of age or a vulnerable person, as defined in the act, relating to certain criminal offenses shall be admissible in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances.

These provisions are identical to provisions in SB 905 (2024), SB 906 (2024), SB 1245 (2024), SB 1398 (2024), HCS/SS#3/SB 22 (2023), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 (2023), and the perfected HCS/HB 454 (2023).

UNIFORM INTERSTATE DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY ACT (SECTIONS 510.500 TO 510.521)

This act establishes the Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, which provides procedures for out-of-state subpoenas for certain forms of discovery conducted in Missouri.

To request a subpoena in Missouri, a party shall submit a foreign subpoena to a clerk of the court in the county in which discovery is sought to be conducted. The clerk shall promptly issue a subpoena, which shall incorporate the terms used in the foreign subpoena and include contact information of the attorneys and any party not represented by an attorney in the proceeding to which the subpoena relates. A request for issuance of a subpoena pursuant to this act shall not constitute an appearance in Missouri courts.

The Missouri Supreme Court Rules of Civil Procedure and the laws of this state apply to subpoenas issued pursuant to this act and such subpoenas shall be served in compliance with such rules and laws. Additionally, an application for a protective order or to enforce, quash, or modify a subpoena issued by clerk of this state shall comply with such court rules and laws of this state. However, in applying and construing this act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity among the states.

These provisions shall apply to requests for discovery in cases pending on August 28, 2024.

These provisions are identical to SB 394 (2023) and SB 1005 (2022), are substantially similar to provisions in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), HB 1452 (2024), HCS/HB 2064 (2024), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), HB 84 (2023), in SCS/HCS/HBs 994, 52 & 984 (2023), HB 1549 (2022), HB 347 (2021), and HB 2570 (2020).

PROPERTY WITH COLLECTIBLE JUDGMENTS FILINGS (SECTION 534.157)

This act provides that all transfers of title of real property for rental properties with outstanding collectible judgments shall be filed in the circuit court within 30 days after transfer.

This provision is identical to a provision in CCS/HCS/SS/SB 222 (2023), SB 146 (2021), HB 1378 (2020), and HB 174 (2019) and is substantially similar to HB 2579 (2018).

UNIFORM PUBLIC EXPRESSION PROTECTION ACT (SECTION 537.528 AND 537.529)

This act establishes the "Uniform Public Expression Protection Act". Currently, any action against a person for conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or meeting in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of the state or a political subdivision thereof is subject to a special motion to dismiss, a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary judgment and any such motion shall be considered by the court on a priority or expedited basis. This act repeals this provision and creates procedures for dismissal of causes of action asserted in a civil action based on a person's:

(1) Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding;

(2) Communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding; or

(3) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Missouri Constitution, on a matter of public concern.

However, this act shall not apply to a cause of action asserted:

(1) Against a governmental unit, as described in the act, or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity;

(2) By a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a law to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety; or

(3) Against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the sale or lease of such goods or services.

No later than 60 days after a party is served with a complaint, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading that asserts a cause of action covered by this act, or at a later time upon a showing of good cause, a party may file a special motion to dismiss. The court shall hear and rule on such motion no later than 60 days after the filing of the motion, unless the court orders a later hearing to allow for limited discovery or upon good cause. However, this act provides that the court shall hear and rule on the motion for dismissal no later than 60 days after the order allowing for discovery.

This act provides that all other proceedings between the moving party and the responding party in the action, including discovery and any pending hearings or motions, shall be stayed upon the filing of the special motion to dismiss. Additionally, this act provides that the court may stay, upon motion by the moving party, a hearing or motion involving another party or discovery by another party if a ruling on such hearing or motion or discovery relates to a legal or factual issue.

Any stay pursuant to this act shall remain in effect until the entry of an order ruling on the special motion to dismiss and the expiration of the time to appeal the order. A moving party may appeal an order denying the special motion to dismiss in whole or in part within 21 days of such order. If a party appeals an order ruling on a special motion to dismiss, this act provides that all proceedings between all parties shall be stayed until the conclusion of the appeal.

The court may allow discovery if a party shows that specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied or failed to satisfy the requirements of this act and such information is not reasonably available without discovery. Additionally, a motion for costs and expenses, voluntary dismissal, or a motion to sever shall not be stayed. During a stay, the court upon good cause may hear and rule on any motions unrelated to the special motion to dismiss and any motions seeking a special or preliminary injunction to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety.

In ruling on a special motion to dismiss, this act provides that the court shall consider the parties' pleadings, the motion, any replies and responses to the motion, and any evidence that could be considered in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. The court shall dismiss the cause of action with prejudice if:

(1) The moving party has established that the cause of action is covered by this act;

(2) The responding party has failed to establish that this act does not apply to the cause of action; and

(3) Either the responding party failed to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action, or the moving party has established that the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted or that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a cause of action that is subject to a special motion to dismiss pursuant to this act shall not affect the moving party's right to obtain a ruling on the motion and seek costs, reasonable attorneys' fees, and reasonable litigation expenses. Additionally, if the moving party prevails on the motion, this act provides that such costs, fees, and expenses shall be awarded to the moving party. A voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a cause of action that is subject to a special motion to dismiss establishes that the moving party prevailed on the motion. The responding party shall be entitled to such costs, fees, and expenses if the responding party prevails on the motion and the court finds that the motion was frivolous or filed solely with the intent to delay the proceeding.

Finally, this act applies to causes of action filed or asserted on or after August 28, 2024.

These provisions are identical to provisions in HB 1785 (2024), CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023) and are substantially similar to provisions in SB 1293 (2024), HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), SB 432 (2023), HB 750 (2023), SB 1219 (2022), in HCS/SS#2/SCS/SB 968 (2022), HB 2624 (2022), and HB 1151 (2021).

INFORMATION RECEIVED BY PROBATION & PAROLE OFFICERS (SECTION 559.125)

This act modifies provisions relating to privileged information received by probation or parole officers which shall not be receivable in any court except for criminal proceedings.

This provision is identical to a provision in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), is substantially similar to a provision in HB 1954 (2024), HB 196 (2023), in HCS/SS#3/SB 22 (2023), and in HB 1227 (2023), and is similar to a provision in HCS/HB 1886 (2024), in HCS/HB 2700 (2024), HCS/SS/SCS/SBs 189, 36 & 37 (2023), and in HCS/HB 776 (2023).

OFFENSES OF ENTICEMENT OF A CHILD & OFFENSE OF PATRONIZING PROSTITUTION (SECTION 566.151 AND 567.030)

Under current law, a person over 21 years old commits the offense of enticement of a child if he or she persuades any person less than 15 years old to engage in sexual conduct. This act changes the age to less than 17 years old.

Additionally, this act modifies the offense of patronizing prostitution. If the person patronized for prostitution is ages 15 to 17 it shall be a class E felony and if the person is less than 15 years old it shall be a class B felony.

These provisions are identical to provisions in SS#2/SCS/SB 811 (2024), in SB 906 (2024), in SB 1245 (2024), in SB 1398 (2024), in HB 1450 (2024), in HB 1541 (2024), in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), in HCS/SS#3/SB 22 (2023), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), in HCS/HB 454 (2023), in HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 (2023), in HB 1637 (2022), in SCS/HB 2088, HB 1705 & HCS/HB 1699 (2022), and in SCS/HB 2697, HB 1589, HB 1637 & HCS/HB 2127 (2022), and are similar to provisions in SB 1398 (2024) and in HCS/HBs 1706 & 1539 (2024).

CRIME VICTIMS' COMPENSATION FUND (SECTIONS 595.045)

This act adds that a person who pleads guilty to a class E felony shall pay a fee of $46 payable to the Crime Victims' Compensation Fund.

This provision is identical to a provision in HCS#2/HB 1886 (2024), in HCS/HB 2700 (2024), in HCS/SS#3/SB 22 (2023), in CCS/HCS/SS/SCS/SB 72 (2023), and in HS/HCS/HBs 1108 & 1181 (2023).

KATIE O'BRIEN