Missouri Senate

Senate Substitute

FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS - 192.2260, 301.559, 339.100, 400.9-501, 571.020 - 571.072, 632.520, & Section B

During the 2014 session, the General Assembly passed a large-scale revision of the Missouri Criminal Code, which included the addition of a class E felony and a modification of the terms of imprisonment for Class C, D, and E felonies.

Under current law, the maximum term for a class C felony is seven years and the maximum term for a Class D felony is four years. Beginning January 1, 2017, when SB 491 (2014) takes effect, the term of imprisonment for a Class C felony will be three to 10 years, the maximum term for a Class D felony will be seven years, and the maximum term for a Class E felony will be four years.

To reflect the change in the authorized terms of imprisonment, this act modifies several crimes once classified as Class C felonies to make them Class D felonies and crimes once classified as Class D felonies have become Class E felonies.

These provisions are identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016) and SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015).

ELDER ABUSE REPORTING - 192.2405, 192.2410, 192.2475 & 565.188

Under current law, certain types of people must report to the Department of Health and Senior Services if the person has reasonable cause to suspect that a person 60 years of age or older or an eligible adult has been subject to abuse or neglect. This act provides that reports only need to be made if the victim is an eligible adult. The act further adds emergency medical technicians, firefighters, and first responder to the list of mandated reporters. A provision regarding an investigation of abuse by a in-home services client manager and local area agency on aging training is repealed.

These provisions are identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016) and are similar to SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015).

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS IN LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES - 198.070

This act amends the provision relating to reporting of suspected abuse and neglect of a resident of a long-term care facility who is sixty years of age or older or an eligible adult. Current law requires a report to be made to the Department of Health and Senior Services in the event of suspected abuse and neglect. Under this act, in the event of a suspected sexual assault of the resident, specified mandated reporters shall also report to local law enforcement under the procedures of the federal Elder Justice Act of 2009.

This provision is identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016) and is substantially similar to SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015) and SB 971 (2014).

MIRANDA WARNINGS TO JUVENILE OFFENDERS - 211.059

When a child is taken into custody, current law requires law enforcement officials to advise the child prior to questioning that the child has the right to remain silent, that any statement made can be used in court, has the right to have a parent present, and has the right to an attorney. This act provides that any court recognized exception to the giving of Miranda warnings to an adult prior to interrogation shall also apply to this requirement that a child be given such advise.

JUVENILE SHACKLING - 211.436

This act provides that, when a juvenile court has a rule or otherwise requires the use of restraints during proceedings, the juvenile's attorney must have the right to be heard on a request that the restraints not be used. If the court orders the use of restraints, the court must make findings of fact in support of the use of restraints.

This provision is identical to SB 918 (2016).

SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN - 217.151

This act prohibits the use of restraints on offenders during the second and third trimesters of pregnancy and for 48 hours after delivery unless a doctor treating the pregnant or post-partum offender has determined that extraordinary circumstances exist. This act defines "extraordinary circumstances."

Under this act, pregnant and postpartum offenders must be transported in cars with seatbelts. If restraints are used, they must be the least restrictive available. Leg or waist restraints may not be used on pregnant or postpartum offenders and restraints must not be used if a health care provider treating the offender requests that restraints not be used.

Whenever a doctor determines extraordinary circumstances exist and restraints are used, the doctor must fully document certain information in writing within 7 days of the incident. This act requires the Sentencing and Corrections Oversight Commission and the advisory committee on women's programs to conduct biannual reviews of the written reports. The Department of Corrections must keep the reports on file for five years.

This act requires the head of each prison to provide training to prison employees on the requirements of this act and inform female offenders of the prison's policies and practices regarding the use of restraints on pregnant and postpartum inmates.

This provision is identical to a provision of SB 977 (2016).

Certain sections of this act have a delayed effective date of January 1, 2018.

TWO-WAY TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVICES IN PRISONS AND JAILS - 217.360 & 221.111

Under current law, it is a crime to possess, deliver, deposit, or conceal certain items in a prison or jail. This act adds two-way telecommunications devices and their component parts to the list of prohibited items.

This act provides that the prohibition on telecommunications devices does not apply to law enforcement officers lawfully engaged in their duties or any person who is authorized to use such a device in the facility.

This provision is identical to SB 689 (2016), SCS/SB 663 (2016), and SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015) and is substantially similar to SB 252 (2015).

PROBATION AND PAROLE - 217.670, 217.690, & 217.722

This act removes the statutory provision allowing an offender to object to the use of videoconferencing at probation and parole hearings, and requires the Board of Probation and Parole to conduct an interview, rather than a personal interview, of the offender before ordering parole.

These provisions are identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016) and SB 1006 (2016).

This act requires a probation officer who has probable cause to believe a probationer has violated a condition of probation to notify the prosecuting or circuit attorney.

This provision is identical to SB 681 (2016), and SCS/SB 31 (2015).

FAILURE TO YIELD - 304.351

Currently, a person who causes physical injury or death to another person by failing to yield the right-of-way is subject to additional monetary penalties and driver's license suspensions. This act increases the maximum penalty for a person who causes physical injury to a person by failing to yield the right-of-way from $200 to $500, and requires a minimum penalty of $200 to be assessed. In the case of serious physical injury this act increases the maximum penalty from $500 to $1,500, and requires a minimum penalty of $250 to be assessed. This act increases the maximum penalty for a person who causes the death of another person by failing to yield the right-of-way from $1,000 to $5,000, and requires a minimum of $1,000 to be assessed. In addition, the person who causes a fatality by failing to yield the right-of-way must successfully complete a driver-improvement program.

This provision is identical to SB 917 (2016), SCS/SB 267 (2015) and is similar to SB 696 (2014), HB 1149 (2014), SB 130 (2013), and SCS/SB 805 (2012).

MINORS AND ALCOHOL - 311.310 & SECTION B

Under current law, it is a Class B misdemeanor for a property owner to knowingly allow a person under the age of 21 to drink or possess intoxicating liquor or fail to stop a minor from drinking or possessing liquor. This act makes the offense a Class A misdemeanor. Any subsequent violation is a Class E felony.

This provision takes effect January 1, 2017.

This provision is identical to SB 614 (2016) and SCS/SB 30 (2015).

ELECTRONIC MONITORING WITH VICTIM NOTIFICATION - 455.095

This act provides that a court may place a person on electronic monitoring with victim notification if the person is charged with, or has been found guilty of, violating an order of protection.

Electronic monitoring with victim notification is defined as a monitoring system that can monitor the movement of a person and immediately transmit the person's location to the victim and local law enforcement when the person enters a certain area.

The court only may place a person on electronic monitoring with victim notification if the protected person has provided his or her informed consent. The phrase "informed consent" is defined under the act.

The person being monitored must pay the costs associated with the monitoring unless he or she is determined by the court to be indigent. If determined to be indigent, the court clerk must notify the Department of Corrections and send a bill for the monitoring costs to the department. The department must establish a procedure to determine the portion of costs the indigent person is able to pay and must seek reimbursement of such costs. This act gives the Department of Corrections rulemaking authority for this provision.

Under this act, an alert is probable cause to arrest the monitored person for a violation of a protective order.

This act requires the Department of Corrections, Department of Public Safety, Missouri State Highway Patrol, circuit courts, and local law enforcement agencies to share information obtained via the electronic monitoring.

This act provides immunity from liability to suppliers of the electronic monitoring system for certain injuries associated with the use of the system.

These provisions expire August 28, 2022.

These provisions are identical to SB 678 (2016) and are similar to SB 86 (2015) and SCS/SB 640 (2014).

FELONY CLASSIFICATIONS FOR OFFENSES OUTSIDE THE CODE - 557.021

Currently, for offenses outside the criminal code, if the felony is for a maximum term of imprisonment of less than ten years, it shall be considered a Class D felony and if the maximum term is four years, it shall be considered a Class E felony. This act provides that to be considered a Class D felony, the maximum term shall exceed four years but be less than years and maximum term to be considered a Class E felony shall four years or less.

These provisions are identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016).

OFFENSE OF CONSPIRACY - 562.014

This act modifies the offense of conspiracy by providing that if a person conspires to commit a number of offenses, such person can be found guilty of only one offense of conspiracy if the multiple offenses are the object of the same agreement.

This provision is identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016).

FIRST DEGREE MURDER - 565.030 - 565.040, SECTIONS B & C

Under current law, offenders who were under the age of 18 at the time they committed first degree murder must be sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or conditional release. In June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama held that mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile criminal offenders are unconstitutional. As a result, there is no punishment for first degree murder under current law in Missouri that is enforceable against those who committed murder before they turned 18.

This act repeals the mandatory life sentence found to be unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama. Under this act, a person who was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the crime may be sentenced to either imprisonment for at least 50 years or life imprisonment without parole. A person who was under the age of 16 may be sentenced to imprisonment for at least 35 years or life without parole.

A person who was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole prior to June 25, 2012, is eligible for a parole hearing after serving 50 years if the person was 16 or 17 years old at the time of the offense or after serving 35 years if the person was under the age of 16 at the time of the offense.

This act repeals obsolete provisions stating that certain trials are to proceed in a single stage. Other technical changes were made in this act to make the provisions align with amendments to the criminal code in SB 491 (2014).

This act contains an emergency clause for the provisions regarding the penalty for first degree murder.

These provisions are substantially similar to SCS/SB 663 (2016), SB 200 (2015) and contains provisions similar to SB 790 (2014), SB 491 (2014), SB 377 (2013), SB 253 (2013), and SB 872 (2012).

STALKING - 565.225

This act adds the act of knowingly accessing, or attempting to access, the address of a participant of the address confidentiality program administered by the Secretary of State to the elements of aggravated stalking.

Beginning in 2017, as a result of SB 491 (2014), aggravated stalking will be known as stalking in the first degree. This act also adds the act of knowingly accessing, or attempting to access, the address of a participant of the address confidentiality program to the elements of first degree stalking.

This provision is identical to SB 886 (2016) and a provision of SCS/SB 663 (2016) and SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015) and is similar to SB 710 (2014).

CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT - 568.040

This act removes a reference to the issue of good cause from a provision providing that the defendant has the burden of injecting certain issues.

SECOND DEGREE TAMPERING - 569.090

This act updates an intersectional reference to the stealing statute, which was reconfigured under the 2014 Criminal Code revision.

FIRST DEGREE TRESPASS - 569.140

Under current law, a person commits the Class B misdemeanor of first degree trespass by knowingly and unlawfully entering or remaining in another person's building or on another person's real property. This act adds knowingly and unlawfully entering or remaining on a temporary or permanent privately owned structure attached to another person's building or property to the list of actions that constitute first degree trespass.

In order for the act to be first degree trespass, the attached structure must be fenced or otherwise enclosed or actual notice must be given to the trespasser in the form of actual communication or posting of the structure in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of the trespasser.

This provision takes effect on January 1, 2017 and is identical to SB 914 (2016).

STEALING - 570.010 & 570.030

Under this act, it is a Class B felony to physically take or attempt to take property from a person when the property is owned by or in the custody of a financial institution. Physically taking property from a person is currently a Class D felony, unless the property is $25,000 or more in which case it is a Class C felony.

Financial institution is defined as a bank, trust company, savings and loan association, or credit union.

This act is identical to SB 790 (2016) and SCS/HB 254 (2015).

FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT OF A CREDIT OR DEBIT DEVICE - 570.135

This act adds an element to the crime of fraudulent procurement of a credit or debit device. Under the new element, a person commits the Class A misdemeanor if he or she knowingly possesses a fraudulently obtained credit or debit device.

Under current law, business entities must not be held liable for accepting fraudulent applications for credit or debt devices or using fraudulent credit or debit devices in transactions without clear and convincing evidence that the business conspired with the fraudulent procuring of the credit or debit devices. This act specifies that such entities must not be held criminally liable without such evidence.

This provision is identical to SB 624 (2016).

INTOXICATION-RELATED BOATING AND TRAFFIC OFFENSES - 577.001, 577.011, & 577.037

This act provides that a person is an "aggravated boating offender" if he or she has been found guilty of two or more intoxication-related boating offenses committed on separate occasions when at least one of the incidents involved the defendant injuring or killing another person while operating a vessel while intoxicated.

In addition, this act reinserts county and municipal ordinance violations of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs into the definition of "intoxication-related traffic offense". Such municipal and county ordinance violations are included in the definition under current law, but not in the Revised Code.

The definition of "persistent offender" was also modified under the act to include a person who has been found guilty of one intoxication-related traffic offense in which the defendant was operating a vehicle while intoxicated and another person was injured or killed. Similar changes were made to the definition of "persistent boating offender".

These provisions are identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016) and are similar to provisions of SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015).

Under this act, a person who has been found guilty of driving while intoxicated must complete a victim impact program approved by the court. The person is responsible for any charges imposed by the program.

This provision is identical to SB 890 (2016) and is substantially similar to HB 1436 (2016).

This act abrogates the holdings of Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, No. SC4840 (Mo. Jan. 12, 2016) and Stiers v. Dir. of Revenue, ED 101407, 2015 WL 343310 (Mo.App. E.D. Jan. 27, 2015). This act requires admission of relevant chemical analysis of a person's breath in proceedings for any criminal offense or violations of county or municipal ordinances or license suspension or revocation proceedings arising out of acts occurring between December 30, 2012 and April 4, 2014, relating to the operation of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft while in an intoxicated condition or with an excessive blood alcohol content so long as the evidence meets certain conditions outlined in the act. This act deems the provision to be a procedural rule and applicable to all proceedings in progress whether commenced before or after the enactment of the act. This provision contains an emergency clause and is identical to SB 1014 (2016).

CHEMICAL TEST EVIDENCE - 577.037

Under the Revised Code, if a chemical test demonstrates a blood alcohol content of less than .08, any criminal charge related to the operating of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft while intoxicated or with excessive blood alcohol content must be dismissed unless certain other evidence exists. This act removes the reference to offenses of operating a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft with an excessive blood alcohol content from this provision, so it only applies to operating a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft while intoxicated.

This provision is identical to a provision of SCS/SB 663 (2016) and SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015).

OFFENSE OF LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT - 577.060

This act provides that the offense of leaving the scene of an accident is a Class E felony if the defendant has previously been found guilty of the same offense.

This provision is identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016).

ILLEGAL REENTRY - 577.685

This act creates the crime of illegal reentry. An illegal alien commits the crime of illegal reentry if he or she has been removed from the United States under federal law for certain criminal convictions and is later found in Missouri unless the alien is otherwise permitted to enter the country under federal law. Illegal reentry is punishable as a Class E felony.

This act requires the person in charge of a facility in which an illegal alien is detained upon arrest for illegal reentry to transfer custody of the alien to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement as soon as practicable.

This provision takes effect January 1, 2017.

This provision is similar to SB 612 (2016).

ANIMAL OR LIVESTOCK TRESPASS - 578.005 - 578.040

Currently, the crime of animal trespass is defined as a person having ownership of an animal who fails to provide adequate control of the animal for a period of 12 hours or more.

Under this act, a person commits the offense of animal or livestock trespass by either failing to provide adequate control of any animal except livestock when the animal trespasses on another person's property or failing to provide adequate control of livestock for a period of 12 hours or more when the livestock trespasses on another person's property.

In addition, this act removes the maximum fines that may be charged for animal or livestock trespass, which potentially conflict with another provision of law setting the maximum fines for infractions and Class C misdemeanors. This act repeals a provision stating that reasonable costs for the care and maintenance of trespassing animals may not be waived.

These provisions are identical to SB 721 (2016) and provisions of SCS/SB 663 (2016) and SS/SCS/SBs 112, 212, 143, & 234 (2015).

LAW ENFORCEMENT DOGS - 578.007 & 578.022

Under current law, the killing of an animal that is not on its owner's property when the animal is injuring a person or farm animal is exempt from the animal abuse statute. The exemption specifies that it does not apply to police or guard dogs while working. This act replaces the reference to "police or guard dogs" with a reference to "law enforcement officer dog" and provides that the exemption does not include the killing or injuring of such dogs.

In addition, current law exempts law enforcement dogs that bite in the course of their official duties from certain criminal and civil liabilities. This act specifies that injuries caused by such dogs are also exempt from liability and adds a reference to the offense of animal abuse to the list of liabilities that do not apply to police dogs.

These provisions are identical to SCS/SB 663 (2016).

INTERVENTION AND COMPLIANCE UNIT PILOT PROGRAM - 589.800

This act requires the Department of Public Safety to establish the Intervention and Compliance Unit Pilot Program in St. Louis City with the purpose of reducing and preventing violent crime. The program shall develop policies and procedures to focus on early detection of violent criminal behavior, address crime recidivism, and collect and monitor crime data, as well as develop strategies for improving mental and social service programs which address needs for reducing violent crime.

The program shall expire in six years after the effective date of this act unless reauthorized by the General Assembly.

The provision is identical to SB 1036 (2016) and is substantially similar to HB 2434 (2016).

DNA COLLECTION FROM FELONY OFFENDERS - 650.055

Under current law, every individual who is 17 years old or older and is arrested for burglary, sex-related felonies, and certain felonies committed against a person must provide a biological sample for DNA profiling analysis.

This act requires every individual who is 17 years old or older who is arrested for any felony offense to provide a biological sample for DNA profiling.

This provision is identical to SB 729 (2016), SB 76 (2015), and SB 879 (2014).

MEGHAN LUECKE