HCS/SS#2/SB 167 - This act modifies provisions relating to the protection of certain persons and animals.RESTRAINTS ON CHILDREN IN JUVENILE COURT (Section 211.436)
This act provides that a child shall not be restrained during a juvenile court proceeding and, if restrained, the restraints shall be removed prior to the child's appearance before the court, unless the court finds the restraints are necessary, as described in the act.
If the juvenile officer believes there is an immediate safety or flight risk and needs to restrain the child, the juvenile officer shall advise the child's attorney and make a request in writing prior to the hearing in which the officer wishes the child to be restrained. If the request for restraints is made by the juvenile officer, the court shall order a hearing and allow the child's attorney an opportunity to be heard. If restraints are ordered, the court shall provide facts in support of the order.
If restraints are used, the restraints shall allow the child limited movement to read and handle documents and writings necessary to the proceeding. Under no circumstances shall the child be affixed by use of a restraint to a stationary object.
This provision is identical to a provision in HCS/SS/SB 43 (2025), SB 718 (2025), HB 782 (2025), HCS/HB 1505 (2025), and in SCS/HCS/HB 1464 (2025).
WARRANTS FOR ENTRY ON PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR NEGLECTED OR ABUSED ANIMALS (Section 578.018)
Current law provides that any public health official or law enforcement official may seek a warrant from the appropriate court to enter onto private property to inspect, care for, or impound neglected or abused animals. This act provides that only a law enforcement official may seek a warrant from the appropriate circuit court to enter onto private property to inspect, care for, or confiscate neglect or abused animals as set forth in the warrant. In addition to the inclusion of an affidavit stating the probable cause, all warrants shall be signed and witnessed. Furthermore, this act modifies the requirements for a person acting under the authority of a warrant, including a prohibition on the sterilization of animals prior to the completion of a disposition hearing.
If there is no finding of neglect or abuse at the disposition hearing and the court orders a confiscated animal to be returned to the owner, the owner shall not be responsible for the confiscated animal's care and keeping prior to the disposition hearing. If the court finds that neglect or abuse of the confiscated animal likely occurred, the owner may prevent disposition of the animal by posting a reasonable bond within 72 hours of the disposition hearing in an amount sufficient to provide for the care and keeping of the animal and consistent with the fair market cost of boarding at an appropriate retail boarding facility.
This act provides that if a licensed veterinarian finds that the animal was diseased or disabled beyond recovery for any useful purpose, rather than just diseased or disabled, then the owner shall not be entitled to recovery any damages related to the animal. All confiscated animals shall receive proper care. Any facility or organization where the animal is placed shall be liable to the owner for negligent actions or abuse of the animal while in the facility or organization's care, custody, and control. If the owner is not liable for the costs incurred for the animal's placement and care while charges are pending, the placement and care costs, as well as any liability and costs for any medical procedures during such time, shall be paid by the confiscating agency.
If the owner posted a sufficient bond and is acquitted or if there is a final discharge without conviction except in cases of settlement agreements, consent judgments, or suspended imposition of sentence, the owner may demand the animal's return and the owner shall not be liable for any costs incurred relating to the animal's placement or care during the pendency of the charges.
Any person or entity that intentionally euthanizes or sterilizes an animal prior to a disposition hearing or during any period for which reasonable bond was secured shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor and shall be liable to the owner for damages. Any subsequent violation is a class A misdemeanor and any licensed entity shall be subject to discipline by the state licensing body.
This act is identical to HCS/HB 489 (2025), is substantially similar to a provision in HB 2204 (2022), and is similar to a provision in HB 1826 (2024), in SB 132 (2023), in HB 630 (2023), in SB 847 (2022), in SB 201 (2021), in SB 816 (2020), and in the perfected HCS/HB 2111 (2020), in SB 115 (2019), in HB 204 (2019), in HB 1945 (2018), in SB 331 (2017), in HCS/HB 384 (2017), in HB 1969 (2016), and in HCS/HB 79 (2015).
DANNY'S LAW: OFFENSE OF HAZING (Section 578.365)
This act provides that the offense of hazing shall be known as "Danny's Law" and provides that a person is guilty of the offense of hazing if a person knowingly, actively, and not under duress participates in, solicits another person to participate in, or causes or plans a willful act that endangers a student or certain members of organizations under the sanction of a public or private college or university.
This act provides that a person shall not be guilty of the offense of hazing if the person establishes that he or she:
· Was present at the event where hazing occurred and a person was in need of immediate medical assistance;
· Was the first person to call 911 or campus security to report the need for medical attention;
· Provided the relevant information to the 911 operator or campus security; and
· Remained at the scene until medical assistance arrived and cooperated with such assistance.
Additionally, this act provides that a person shall be immune from prosecution if the person can establish he or she rendered aid to the hazing victim before assistance arrived.
This act is identical to a provision in HCS/SS/SB 43 (2025), HCS/HB 234 (2025), in SCS/HCS/HBs 971, 293 & 978 (2025), and is similar to SB 384 (2025), SB 1427 (2024), and HB 1443 (2024).
KATIE O'BRIEN